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SUMMARY: 
This paper shows the encounter between an object found among the Luba of 
Zaire and the art historical treatment of it by western scholars. In this encounter 
certain tendencies are pointed out which on one hand point to a greatly 
unackowledged bias of western scholars in their regarding of foreign objects as 
art, and on the other hand may work to refigure those ways of seeing to form a 
richer understanding of memory, beauty and history in western scholarly 
practice. 
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When I was about ten years old, as I remember it, once every so often I would go 
with my parents to a big discount store and, while they shopped, I would 
inevitably make my way alone to the electronics counter where I would linger, 
staring into the glass showcases at the transistor radios, binoculars, digital 
watches, poloroid 
cameras and so on, fascinated at portable wonders, the gadgets of the space 
age. The fascination began as one of an aesthetic sort (one might say). I 
remember being fascinated by the mysterious, finely molded plastic and metal 
shapes of these devices and by the finely tuned electronic magic contained with 
them. Among these 'devices' I remember in particular the display of newly 
invented pocket calculators, my favorite of which was the Texas Instruments 
TI-30. In turning it on I would see the very fine lined block-shaped red zero, so 
small but glowing there before me in firey red light [see figure 1], There was 
something diabolical in this bright rectangular zero followed by a fine red 
decimal point. If one stared at it for more than say a minute the zero would 
disappear and the tiny red decimal point would begin to run from the far left of 
the little window to the right continuously until someone pushed one of the small 
black buttons (set against a golden background) causing the display to change. I 
remember punching in numbers of all values and sizes 'into ' this new invention, 
while I stood there, adding and subtracting huge sums with lightning speed; as I 
watched the fine, glowing red figures change revealing the secrets of numbers to 
me. I remember being amazed at all of the different mysterious functions 
represented by abbrevaiations like 'sin ', 'cos ', and 'log ', being and doing I did 
not know what as I played with them. 
As time went on I would come with other kids from the neighborhood who would 
show me how to further unlock the secrets of this 'device '. Pressing the 'on ' 
button and then the numbers 7734, one only needed to rotate the device so that it 
was standing on its head to see the tiny glowing red 7734 was actually 'hELL '. 
The device, with its little Texas Instruments logo (the shape of Texas with a little 
't ' and 'i ' in it) in the upper lefthand comer was a great source of revelation 
into not only the mysterious dark corners of science, but into the world which 
this science represented. Even though the greeting 'hELLO ' would seem to also 
be a possibility, the device would yield no such pleasantry for no number could 
start with zero and, if a decimal point was used, the greeting just somehow 
would not be whole and true. The real revelation provided by this machine (and 
others following it), known to children all over America as I have come to leam, 
was a game in which one added certain figures as one gave a corporate 
inventory in the following way: 'Which company has 69,000 employees, 6000 
145 trucks, 345 limosines, 500 ships and 1500 offices all over the country'? By 
adding each number with the device turned on its head as one went along, the 
riddle one was narrating slowly came to a sum/series of letters which revealed 
that the huge corporation described was 'ShELL '. 1 remember above all the feel 
against my fingertips as I ran them accross the little plastic buttons, holding the 
TI-30 in my hands, looking at the fine red lights as it reveald secret after secret. 
Beyond its being a 'storehouse of information ' its beauty lay in its mystery, 
something strangely related to the object which I have just now tried to convey 
by means of story. 
From Marcel Mauss' classic work The Gift we are burdened with the powerful 
notion that each gift contains an element which is in a sense poison to the one 
receiving it. In the long history of exchanges between cultures objects of all sorts 
have been the agents of the gift's poison. My general focus in tin's work will be on 
objects which, in the period of European conquest and colonization, have come to 
be thought of as objects of art. Using one such object in particular I intend to 
relate a certain mode of relation found in the consciousness of a great many 
colonialist and post-colonialist scholars and within the ideology which surrounds 
them (us?). 
A main focus of this examination is on the powerful notion of memory and how 
our understandings of it are and can be altered (poisoned) by other 
understandings. There exists a certain tendency in the forms of exchange 
described above for those on the European side to not fully take part in the spirit 
of gift as Mauss describes it. With every such exchange the main element 
involved is that of loss. This element is all too often overlooked. The tendency I 
will continue to describe and refer to in what follows is a tendency to ignore this 
element of loss or, in cases in which it is admitted, a tendency to falsely recognize 
it. To recognize a gift is to at one time recognize the power of the giver over 
oneself and to experience a loss
1. Most people in the world live in situations in 
which this recognition and loss are part of daily life (i.e. having endured 
colonization), but many of the ideologies describing these situations (often 
corning from colonial centers of knowledge) seem to resist such recognition witii 
all their might (or weakness). In the class of gift objects under consideration here 
the colonial or post-colonial scholar almost always, as if out of necessity, 
attempts to recognize the spirit of the gift not in terms in winch it is given, but 
rather on his or her own terms. In this way no loss can be experienced or, if it is 
sensed in some way, can be written off as a problem of translation. 
Such objects are therefore not truly recognized as gifts, for in the giving 
(exchange) nothing is truly lost
2. We refuse to recognize this certain class of 
objects as gifts and refer to them instead as objects of art and/or as objects of 
146 beauty. Just as gifting is an experiencing of the other directly (as Mauss describes 
it), the recognition, reception and perception of beauty in objects may be seen as 
an imitation of experiencing, but total refusal to actually experience, the other 
directly. 
GIFTED EXPERIENCE 
Concerning such an indirect experience and recognition of the other Walter 
Benjamin, in lus essay 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', has a good many 
relevant observations. Addressing the notion of correspondences in Baudelaire's 
Fleurs du Mal and their relationship to ritual (to which we will return later), 
Benjamin tells us that the realm of the beautiful is where the ritual value of art 
appears
3. Following this he goes on to give two ways in which beauty can be 
defined: the first being its relationship to history and the second its relationship to 
nature. 'Let us indicate the first relationship briefly' writes Benjamin. 
'On the basis of its historical existence, beauty is an appeal to join those who 
admired it at an earlier time. Being moved by beauty is an ad plures ire, as the 
Romans called dying'
4. 
Here Benjamin points to one of the foundation stones of art history proper, 
admitted or not, which is the notion that one, through historical understanding, 
can experience an object in a similar way in which (temporal) others in the past 
experienced it5. This 'historical' sense of beauty, as described by Benjamin, is a 
sort of gift in which we at one time experience loss and some form of communion 
with the (temporal) others who are the givers of the gift. This sense of beauty is 
that on which primitivism most heavily relies, primitivism being the move of 
living peoples in present times and spaces into a temporal and spacial location in 
the past. The beauty of the primitive 'art object' is a sort of gift in which we at 
one time experience loss and some sort of communion with the 
(temporal/primitive) others who are the givers of the gift. 
'Among the 'devices ' I remember in particular the display of newly invented 
pocket calculators, my favorite of which was the Texas Instrument TI30 '. 
But it is how we experience this sort of gift we are calling beauty which is at 
issue here. For an art historian, as an historian, to honestly experience this beauty 
he or she would need to experience loss and some sort of communion with those 
(temporal) others who gave it to him or her, i.e. with those who 'admired it at an 
earlier time'. But the whole point of primitivism tells us that those givers from an 
earlier time are, at the same time, in the here and now (in the eternal past which is 
147 eternally present) and thus such a loss and some sort of communion with those 
past givers is immediately possible. The requirements of such an exchange, 
however, are not compatible with the history of art as we know it. For what 
would historical understanding mean if, as in this case, it is immediately available 
and not in 'the past' or in 'memory'as we know it? Such an exchange would 
demand, first of all, that the notion of history be understood in a way other than 
the way in which it now is. Instead of rejecting the primitive outright it would be 
necessary to embrace it in a certain sense, to recognize it. Here it is the primitive 
which is the spirit of the gift that we must fully accept and to which we must in a 
certain sense admit validity. If beauty in its historical existence, as Benjamin tells 
us, is 'an appeal to join those who admired it at an earlier time', we must not 
resort to history for it in itself is not a 'joining' with others of an earlier time but 
rather a description of them in ones own terms
6. In doing such history there is 
much gain, but no loss and no communion. If there is any hope in experiencing 
the true 'historical' beauty of an object of art, it must lie in an understanding 
which would be a syncretic fusion of our own terms with the terms of the 
(temporal) other. We must allow the object to work its gifted powers on us and 
admit the loss which this experience brings about. Through this we may come to 
see not only the history and beauty of the object justly, but come to understand 
the history out of which it came and in which it exists. 
GIFTED OBJECT 
Another way of thinking about the problem above would be in terms of memory 
and forgetting. If an honest gifting exchange involves loss and some sort of 
joining of the other and oneself, we could also think of this gifting in terms of 
for-getting (which could be read as 'losing') and re-membering (which could be 
read as 'joining'). If we proceed from here, our avoidance of loss would be an 
avoidance of forgetting ourselves, and our avoidance of joining would be an 
avoidance of the memory of the other
7. But it is exactly this avoidance which we 
find in most historical relations to objects of art. Nowhere is this seen more 
clearly than in discussions of West African art. In the work surrounding the Luba 
object-become-art object called the lukasa we see the topics of memory, 
forgetting, history and beauty all come together in ways which clearly illustrate 
the tendencies outlined above. 
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lukasa is described as follows: 
'The devil's toy: the lukasa ' 
All the examples I have seen are approximately the same size (20-25 centimeters 
long and about 13 centimeters wide) and have rectangular dish shape [see 
figure 2J. A row of carved mounds called lukala invariably runs across the 
concave surface of the lukasa, dividing it in half. Beads and shells are attached 
to the board by small slivers of wood or hand made iron wedges driven through 
their centers, and cowrie shells are frequently attached at the top and the 
bottom. Beads are arranged in three ways: a large bead surrounded by smaller 
beads, a line of beads, and one isolated bead. Each configuration lends itself to 
the transmission of certain kinds of information. Board surfaces also have holes 
and lines cut into them. 
In considering this strange, multi-colored object we should wonder why many of 
us tend to describe it as beautiful. At first this descriptive tendency seems simple 
enough: it just simply is beautiful in a certain way, we might be tempted to say. 
The colors, the wooden background and substantiality of the object, the strangely 
ordered configurations of the beads, shells... what more does one in some real 
sense need to simply say it is beautiful? 
I cannot help but feel, however, that while it is simple, it is also not simple. From 
some other perspective, than the one found among many enthusiasts of African 
art, it is possible to recognize this object as diabolical, esoteric, 'fetishistic', 
spooky, dangerous, and in some sense grotesque. I contend that these two 
perspectives, which seem mutually exclusive, are often found together, secretly 
working in synthesis. I urge the reader to try viewing the 1 ukasa as it is 
displayed, discussed and, in many senses, used here, in a way which is beautiful 
and grotesque at once. For the remainder of this examination the strange word 
lukasa should be reminiscent of iu-cifer' and some strange magical expression in 
our imagination 'kasa!' Shortening or drawing out the vowels to one's liking, it 
should become a delightful profanation reminiscent of a strangely beautiful, 
enchanting instrument, like the pipes of Pan, blowing soft tones in some 
other-worldly Arcadia. 
150 GIFTED FUNCTION 
But we are jarred from our sylvan reminiscence when this object, which we 
would like to remain in awe of, is described as a 'device', demanding that we 
consider not only its form, but its function as well. The lukasa, we are told, is 
(used as) a 'mnemonic device' among the Luba of Zaire. Its function, we are told 
by scholars like Reefe, is 'the transmission of certain kinds of information.' The 
board, we are told, 'contains,' 'shares,' and 'communicates' information. This 
small, hand sized wooden object, Reefe tells us, 'is a storehouse of information.' 
Having to consider this we are moved into the realm of design, where an aesthetic 
of form and function become one. The beauty, we are told, is not solely in its 
appearance, as a mix of color, shape, (maybe tactility) and a certain uncanny 
order, but equally in the tactile, mental use of the object as it connects body to 
mind through the finger tips, hands and eyes in its 'retrieval of information.' 
Beyond the function of the lukasa, described above, Reefe stresses the secret 
society in which it functions. We are told of a secret society within a larger 
society and how the lukasa's functions of transmission, retrieval, storage and so 
on work within it. It is 'the function of sculpture within the society' winch 
collectors, and the art historians who study their collections, have not yet come to 
appreciate, says Reefe. In a passage near the beginning of his essay Reefe tells us 
more about the lukasa, mixing its history and function with problems in its 
ethnographic access: 
Lukasa, 'the long hand' (or claw), is an esoteric memory device that was 
created, manipulated and protected by the Bambudye, a once powerful secret 
society of the Luba. Although it cannot be compared exclusively on aesthetic 
grounds with Luba political and religious art such as royal stools and canes, 
statues of deities and culture heroes, and religious masks, it was an integral part 
of the inventory of carved artifacts that served the needs of the political and 
religious system. Very few examples of lukasa came to light during the colonial 
period because their secret functions caused them to be hidden. Certain 
developments occuring within the past thirty years, however, have made it 
possible to gather information about this object. First of all, the Bambudye has 
been defunct as a secret society since the end of World War II, and people no 
longer fear its power. Second, because the device is not used now, Luba 
individuals and families are willing to show their lukasa to an investigator. 
Third, examples have not been snatched up by art collectors or smugglers in 
recent years because they do not fit into the more marketable categories of 
statues, masks and stools
9. 
151 The story of the lukasa, we are told, 'is intimately associated with the history of 
the Luba empire' which, during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth 
centuries was a dominant power in the northern Shaba portion of what is today 
Zaire. All chiefs and possible candidates for office were required to be members 
of the Bambudye society and the king of the empire was its highest ranking 
member. The age of the lukasa itself, we are told, is not clear. 
We are further told that lukasa were made by standardized design and that they 
came in three distinct types, each having a different function. These functions 
were: (a) to 'bear information' on 'mythical heroes and early rulers and mythical 
trade routes of the Luba,' which are found in and gotten from the great genesis 
story of the Luba (which the board serves 'as a memory aid for.'), (b) to bear 
information on the organization of the Bambudye society itself, which included its 
initiation rituals and spacial arrangements within its initiation lodges, and to 
remind and teach members of secrecy and morality in and outside the society, and 
(c) to 'contain secret information about divine kingship,' about which he writes: 
The lukasa also helped senior Bambudye titleholders to remember deities and 
ancestral spirits. The bambudye society was an important religious institution 
closely associated with the concept of divine rule. Rulers entered the pantheon 
of ancestral spirits when they died. High-ranking Bambudye title holders 
engaged in spirit possession, and some claimed they were possessed by the 
spirits of dead Luba rulers
10. 
In this last, crucial quote we are told that the lukasa was intimately associated 
with rule. Indeed the whole concern with the lukasa in the thinking surrounding 
it, and in this paper which is a critique of that thinking, is inseparably bound with 
the concept of rule and its relationship to possession. There is a struggle going on 
here, in these thoughts and facts about the lukasa, which is a struggle for rule in 
general. This struggle, when viewed in the context of colonial influence and 
exchange in West Africa, and through the ritual objects of its ever attendant 
fictionally real 'secret societies' (such as Bambudye), takes on a power equally as 
great as the old rulers of the Luba themselves. The key here, as we have been 
told, is memory; and the key to this key is the lukasa. We must come to see the 
lukasa not as a key to the memories of origins, secrets, spacial relationships, 
ancestors and so on which make up the power of rule among the Luba alone, but 
as a key to the memories of these as they exist, at this point in time, inseparably 
mixed with our own memories. These memories form (and are a key to) the 
concept of our own colonial 'divine rule'. 
This problem, which is here expressed in terms of rule (and resistance) can also 
been seen on the level of the lukasa as a 'mnemonic device'. In referring to the 
152 lukasa in this technical way what are we actually doing? A good many of the 
facts which Reefe obtained for, and used in his study of the Bambudye and the 
lukasa come from two missionaries who did work among the Luba some 60 
years ago. He writes: 
My first informants were two missionaries who had carried out research on the 
Bambudye initiates who revealed some, but not all, of the mysteries of the 'long 
hand
1". 
The words 'my first,' pointing to a primary role in Reefe's 'investigations,' lead 
us back to the very same problem as above, i.e. the concept of our own colonial 
'divine rule'. My point here is not to question the validity of starting research on 
a subject with the assumptions given to one by missionaries (whatever one may 
think of tins). The role of the two missionaries must, rather, serve a more 
important purpose here, which is to emphasize the préexistence of a 'divine rule' 
not only within our practices and language, but within our memories and 
imagination themselves. These two unnamed missionaries are the sentinels who 
stand at the gates of cultural exchange guarding our own understanding from any 
loss and/or poisonous agents which may try to enter and undermine our own 
concept of 'divine rule'. 
IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE GIFT 
Now let us consider this so called mnemonic device as a device. To do this I refer 
the reader to another object from my own experience, which is a bit like the 
lukasa. Most all examples I have seen of this object are between 15-20 
centimeters in length, between 10 and 17 centimeters wide, and vary from 1-10 
centimeters in depth. These objects most often have a solid rectangular shape and 
may contain a great many separate parts all attached at one end. These separate 
parts, enclosed on three sides by parts of similar make but greater thickness, are 
thin flexible substances made of rags, wood-fibre, grass or similar materials. All 
parts are of equal size. On each of the thin parts, which are tactile and must be 
manipulated to retrieve information from the object as a whole, are units 
patterned in many different ways, often reflecting the speech of the group using it, 
but occasionally reflecting those of other groups as well. These whole patterned 
units are composed of some one hundred (to my best count) smaller units, each 
having its own particular shape, which take the form of some particular twist or 
combination of drawn lines. These whole patterned units usually have no tactile 
quality though they are permanently affixed in black die to the varying light 
brown to white, thin, flexible, rag and wood-fibre substances. Within the object 
as a whole, as within most all of its sub-parts each patterned unit or configuration, 
153 as we are told in the case of the lukasa as well, 'lends itself to the transmission of 
certain kinds of information'. 
The reader may be aware by now that the object I am describing is none other 
than that which we call the Bible. The Bible or 'the good book"
1
2 is (paraphrasing 
Reefe) an esoteric memory device that was created, manipulated and protected by 
the Church, a once powerful secret society of the Christians. Although most 
examples cannot be compared exclusively on aesthetic grounds with Christian 
political and religious art such as crucifixes and chalices, statues of saints and 
martyrs, and religious paraphernalia, it was an integral part of the inventory of 
manufactured artifacts that served the needs of the political and religious system. 
Very few examples came to light during the middle ages because their secret 
functions caused them to be hidden. Certain developments occurring within the 
last 400 years, however, have made it possible to gather information about this 
object. First of all, the Church has been defunct as a secret society for hundreds 
of years in many areas, and people no longer fear its power. Second, because the 
device is now owned by many, Christian individuals are more than willing to 
show their Bible to an investigator. Third, examples have not been snatched up by 
art collectors or smugglers in recent years because they do not fit into the more 
marketable categories of paintings, sculptures and altarpieces. 
What exactly is the difference between the lukasa and the Bible? 
Are we not forced to ask tins question? Its answer is crucial here, where what we 
are told of the lukasa, Bambudye, and their relationship to divine rule comes 
from the an understanding based upon the Bible, the Church, and their 
relationship to colonial divine rule (coming through our two missionaries). But it 
is equally as crucial to all investigations of primitive art objects, secret societies 
and their relationship to any rule in general. The missionaries, be they actual or 
metaphorical, will not let the other pass, and will only allow loss and communion 
to the extent that they occur within the ritual practices of the Bible and church. 
One could say, in response to this: 'Okay. So the Bible is a mnemonic device, 
and thus you have shown that the different is really the same, but still different, 
thereby allowing us to transcend our current understandings - right?' And the 
answer to this question would be strongly against such a transcendence. The 
lukasa, I would say, mimics our object of understanding (our Bible) and creates a 
dialectical estrangement of that understanding. We can see the lukasa defying the 
imposition of our understanding if we look closely enough. In looking closer we 
see both understandings working to negate one another, moving together in 
synthesis. This is a view of the everyday syncretic reality of those people forming 
154 the Luba, and (though unacknowledged) moving together, or desperately begging 
to, in our own everyday reality as we read about African arts. 
GIFTED MEMORY 
Memory, like beauty, is and is not a simple matter. In thinking about memory in a 
reflective, philosophical way we soon become so mired in complexity and 
contradiction that we often end up falling back on our intuition and working from 
there. It is exactly this intuitive understanding that I wish to address here, for it 
seems that in talking about memory among the Luba, especially in a a 
nonreflexive way, we cannot help but assume some sort of universal intuitive 
understanding which is based solely upon our own. 
When we turn to page one of the Bible what do we see? An arrangement of units 
we call words, made up of sub-units we call letters, numbers, and punctuation 
marks. How do we retrieve the information 'contained in' these units? We read 
them. What could be more intuitively basic than tins? When we were five years 
old or so we all began to be taught how to read these units. We learned how to 
recognize each letter by a process of memorization, and then, from there, we 
learned how to recognize larger units through a similar process. What is reading, 
in its most basic sense, if not remembering? 'But wait,' many of us feel 
immediately compelled to say in a corrective fashion, 'reading is not so simple.' 
To many it just seems intuitively inadequate to describe such a complex and, in 
our culture, divine activity as reading in terms of remembering. But who says so; 
and who says that saying reading is remembering is simple or a simplification of 
reading? What is it that priveleges our own intuitive understanding in such a way? 
The missionaries at the gates cross their spears, blocking these questions. 'You 
shall not pass,' they bellow. 'But why?' we ask. 'Because it just isn't right.' This 
is the reception which the lukasa is receiving at the gates of western scholarship. 
Consider how Jan Vansina defines mnemonic devices as: 
Objects which... had certain memories attached to them that facilitated 
remembrance of... [a] tradition.'
3 
Following Vansina here, we must look at this description closely and ask which 
certain memories are attached to the Bible that facilitate remembrance of a 
tradition? This question may strike us as strange. To most of the New Testament 
are attached certain memories of the lives of Jesus and the Apostles, and these do 
facilitate remembrance, one could say, of certain traditions like baptism, prayer 
and so forth. But when we consider the Old Testament, say the book of Genesis, 
155 for example, which certain memories are attached to the Bible here that facilitate 
remembrance of a tradition? It is here, in the 'memories' of relations between 
God and man, man and woman, man, woman and sin, and so on, that culture 
comes into play, and with it, those great traditional relations with which we 
describe ourselves (and others). In all of the memories attached to the Bible, and 
this first part in particular, that of 'in the beginning was the word' facilitates 
remembrance of traditions not only of speaking and listening, but more 
importantly, of reading and writing which we hold most dear. 
But how does this all work? Vansina tells us that the key to the mnemonic device 
is that it is not the object/device itself but rather the memories attached to the 
device which facilitate remembrance of a tradition. Mnemonic devices, therefore, 
function in a two step process in which we are reminded of something which 
helps us to remember something much larger, like a tradition. These traditions, 
we must never forget, are essentially oral (and aural) in nature, a point, which in 
our intellectual practices of intertextual reading and writing, is often forgotten and 
may come to form a false intuitive understanding of ourselves and the (temporal) 
other
14. 
These observations by Vansina bring us to look more closely at the way the 
activity we call reading works under the poisonous influence of the other (seen in 
the lukasà). Let us imagine the sound of a drum (a mnemonic device in West 
Africa). We can imagine each unit we call a letter as one particularly sounding 
beat on a drum, or we can imagine each unit we call a word in such a way. When 
I beat out 'rum, ta, ta, turn, tat, ta, rum, rum, ta' which is to say or read: 'in the 
beginning was the word,' the mnemonic device of the drum (or the Bible) (or was 
it my drurnming/reading)
1
5 facilitates the remembrance of a certain tradition
16. But 
as you and I sit here in the last years of twentienth century America our minds 
wondering and wandering, remembering what we can about the meaning of this 
Bible passage, remembering historical references, maybe what recent scholars 
have said about logocentrism, remembering our Greek, Roman and Scholastic 
forefathers, no doubt vaguely, thinking we should go to some other books to 
further 'facilitate our remembrance' (of this tradition), we have the opportunity, 
here and now, to get an idea of what this 'tradition' being remembered is all 
about. It is amazing what one phrase, like 'in the beginning was the word' in a 
certain historical and ritual context (like this paper you are reading) can do. When 
a series of remembered (or read) words on a page, or drumbeats, elicits 
remembrance like this why should we not look upon this with wonder. It is even 
more fascinating to think that in the Bible as a whole there are probably tens of 
thousands of such 'memories' available to facilitate remembrance of traditions in 
a great many of us. 
156 GIFTED EXPERIENCE II 
But is this what this object the Bible is all about? As a mnemonic device, which 
has memories attached to it which help facilitate remembrance of a tradition, is it 
not the object itself which is most valued? The many evenly cut pages with their 
many letter and word units attached, bound and covered, would seem to be that 
which we most basically possess when we possess a Bible. One could say that if 
we possess the object which we call the Bible, we possess the memories attached 
to it and thereby a tradition which these memories, in strange and mysterious 
ways, help us to remember. This leads us to the question of what exactly we 
possess when we possess the lukasa. It would seem, following what has come 
before, that in posessing any object like the lukasa we at once hope to possess 
the memories attached to it and the tradition which they help the members of the 
'secret' Bambudye society to remember. This should loudly point out the 
ignorance with which many have sought such a possession, for how can one have 
memories of and remember a tradition of something in which one never has and 
never will have a part?
1
7 To assume that one can understand die 'reading' of the 
lukasa, even partially, is to say that one has taken part. It is believed that in 
possessing the object, holding it in the arms of ones own words and making it 
ones own, that one has in some sense taken part in that which the object reminds 
others of, and the tradition which others remember from it. In other words, one 
would need nothing less than the experiences of the other; one would need to 
experience the object as the other. One would need to not only have experienced, 
or to know the oral tradition of the other, but one would further have had to in 
some sense experienced the collective experiences which those words or 
drumbeats are memories of. This coming together of individual and collective 
memory is most often achieved through taking part in that winch ethnology has 
traditionally refered to as ritual. But this in itself says very little, for it is how we 
view ritual in relation to the lukasa which as at issue here rather than a simple 
assertion of the ritual element in itself.
1
8 
When we look at the Bible or lukasa as mnemonic devices we see objects which, 
through the patterning, design and general arrangement of smaller units, divisons 
and so on, have had memories attached to them which facilitate remembrance of a 
tradition. 
Though this is clear enough, we may further ask why, exactly, the Bible or lukasa 
exist in these forms and not in another. What if, instead of using the phrase to 
elicit memory, one simply refered to the phrase? What if the Bible, using the book 
of Genesis for example, were not an object but simply the numbers 1-50, not 
157 written down, but just remembered in order
19. This series of numbers could have 
had memories attached to each number which facilitated remembrance of a 
tradition. If we need a device to remind us of something which, logically, we 
must have heard or experienced at some time there is no reason, it would seem, 
why it need be so elaborate. 
But there is a reason, and it is with it that we move to the concluding points of 
this examination. That reason has to do with the place of the story in our thought 
as compared with that of the 'secret society' of Bambudye. The views expressed 
above are only thinkable in terms of what Benjamin refers to as information and 
sensation. According to Benjamin, members of our own society have, in modern 
times, become less and less able to relate experiences in the form of story and, as 
a result, are less able to actually experience things in this form as well. He writes: 
Historically, the various modes of communication have competed with one 
another. The replacement of the older narration by information, by information 
by sensation, reflects the increasing atrophy of experience.
20 
Today we are very aware of the descriptive power of the term information, and 
we should admit that this power expresses something which, although for many 
undesireable, is nevertheless quite real. The term sensation, however, adds a 
whole, as of yet unpopular, dimension to the description of our own experience. 
When Benjamin writes that information is being replaced by 'sensation,' he 
means that information is being replaced by material objects which 'contain' 
information or, put another way, in which information is 'present.' Those 
participatory rituals and the objects they work with like the lukasa or the Bible, 
which we call storytelling, were replaced with facts or frozen events told or 
recorded in objects, and now it is these objects themselves which are becoming 
experience. Which is to say that these objects used to be a part of an activity 
called storytelling and not objects as containers of information as we (can barely 
help but) see them today. 
The key point here, however, is not to point out (and lament) the atrophy of 
experience as seen in our treatment of art objects like the lukasa. The greater 
point, having accepted this atrophy as somehow a real state of affairs throughout 
the world, is to see that our treatment of such art objects, our understanding of 
them on our own terms has provided a point of view which allows us to see our 
own terms in a wholly different critical light. By opposing a few of our commonly 
accepted conceptions, such as memory, reading and the ritual object (e.g.the 
Bible) to other conceptions made possible by considering the strange 'thing' (?) 
the Luba call lukasa, I have attempted to establish the need to regard 'art objects' 
as much more complex than we had formerly assumed. In Benjamin's terms the 
I 
158 ritual value of art appears in that which we call its beauty. One of the main 
questions addressed above is how and in what form it appears in the so called 
'mnemonic device'. As I think of the present age in which storytelling has 
become all but impossible, especially in areas of intellectual pursuit where it is 
most needed, my mind wanders back to my experience of the tiny glowing red 
lights of the discount store's pocket calculator, the TI-30, with its black buttons 
on a golden background, and I consider this Luba 'thing' called a lukasa which, 
by chance, I ran upon one day twenty years later while going about my affairs. 
Somehow, through something I can only call 'storytelling,' I want to encounter 
myself at ten years old, there with the TI-30 in my hand, by means of the disarray 
left of all such experience in the wake of the lukasa. I want to join myself there in 
my own childhood where I seemed much closer to the beauty found in Benjamin's 
sense of the ritual value of art, and I want you to join me there in the poisoned 
state of understanding which this paper has been written to create. This would be 
a form of art historical and cultural understanding (of the everyday) which we 
have barely seen the likes of, and desperately need. 
NOTES 
1. Though it must be realized that a gift is also best thought of as a negation and such a 
negation can often work to in some sense enhance the positivity of the situation (if one wishes 
to think of negation in this way). 
2. I refer the reader here to the German verb 'zugeben' which, like the English verb 'to grant,' 
has a sense of both giving and admitting, i.e. giving in, losing, conceding, letting another 'in,' 
and being negated in a positive and cooperative sense where something is learned. 
3. Illuminations, p.182 
4. Ibid., p. 198 
5. My reference to what I call 'temporal others' should be understood as an attempt to directly 
deal with a kind of primitivist imagination in which the Other is seen as ancestor, if you will, as 
one who is from a past form of human existence construed even more generally than primitivist 
and racist evolutionary doctrines and other such related outlooks still hiding behind terms such 
as 'primitive,' 'native,' and so on. A temporal Other could equally designate a man or woman 
whom a certain white westerner sees as his or her ancestors, familially, culturally or otherwise. 
6.1t should also be noted that a great deal of what we call history is not describing but 
ignoring. 
7. That is, avoidance of both the other's form of memory and our memory of the other. 
159 8.1n an article entitled 'Lukasa: A Luba Memory Device,' African Arts, Vol.10, no.4, (1977), 
pp.48-50, 88. 
9. Ibid., p.48 
10. Ibid., p.50 
11. Reefe, African Arts, vol.10, no.4, (1977), p.48 
12. 'The book.' 
13. Oral Tradition, pp.36-37 
14. In The Logic of Practice Pierre Bourdieu wants to focus on traditions in both our own and 
other societies. In his examination of ritual he stresses that our own ritual practices of 
scholarship become mixed up with and inevitably infuse our own practices with those we are 
observing. In this work I am attempting to take Bourdieu one step further and stress the need 
of not only becoming aware of how and where our own practices turn us away from 
understanding the other, but of becoming aware that if a mutually gifted encounter really took 
place, we would not only become aware of our own practices, but would also lose the ability 
to understand them with the same confidence we now do. In other words, one could say that I 
am imagining the Other as social philosopher/researcher and imagining the result when that 
Other uses Bourdieu's illuminating ideas in regarding us. 
15. This all important distinction is very difficult to make, and lies at the heart of our problem 
with 'mnemonic devices.' The device does not stand alone; it is a part of action. 
16. In this case maybe it would facilitate remembrance of what some would call the western 
logocentric tradition itself. 
17. This is the inevitable position of the museum parton. 
18. It strikes me that it may be said that the reading and writing of ethnography is, in a sense, a 
substitute for such ritual here, but this thought cannot be pursued here. 
19. The 'book' of Genesis does, in fact, have fifty chapters as we know it today. 
20. Illuminations, p. 159 
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